Evaluation of Strategic Intelligence on Countering Smuggling Threats Using High Speed Craft

Danang Nuga Setiawan, Margaretha Hanita, Eko Daryanto
Sekolah Kajian Strategik dan Global, Indonesia
E-mail: danznugadanznuga@gmail.com, margaretha.hanita@gmail.com, eko.daryanto151@gmail.com

*Correspondence: danznugadanznuga@gmail.com

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ABSTRACT
This research is based on the increasing threat of sedimentation in water areas by utilizing technological developments through the use of High Speed Crafts (HSC). The increase in threats is faced with obstacles for the authorities in balancing surveillance facilities and infrastructure with the technology used by smugglers. In addition, the need for intelligence data that is integrated with all related apparatus also requires a lot of development. This paper uses a qualitative approach. The data used are secondary data derived from related documents from several institutions, mass media articles and literature reviews related to strategic intelligence. Researchers concluded that smuggling using High Speed Crafts (HSC) in Indonesian waters has been frequent for the past few years. In 2019 and 2020, the DJBC and the Ministry of Finance succeeded in uncovering the practice of smuggling using HSC which had the potential to cause considerable state losses related to alleged money laundering crimes. The mode of HSC smuggling is carried out by the ship-to-ship method from large ships. Enforcement is challenged because the surveillance vessel facilities have a capacity that is not faster than the ships owned by the perpetrators, plus the changing point of the HSC of the smugglers spread across Sumatra and Java. An important evaluation of the supervision of smuggling in the HSC mode is at least related to increasing the quantity and capacity of DJBC through human resources and surveillance ship facilities that have capabilities above the facilities owned by smugglers.

Introduction
Various modes or ways are carried out by smugglers to enter contraband into Indonesian territory. As in the case of narcotics smuggling, dealers make various efforts to deceive customs officers and other law enforcement officials. Several efforts were
made such as changing the shape of goods or smuggling in certain packages, to using humans by swallowing or hiding in clothes.

Various modes are also developing in accordance with technological developments and surveillance efforts carried out by related officials. One of the modes that smugglers use is to use high-speed boats (High Speed Crafts/HSC). In the past few years, this mode has begun to be revealed by the Directorate General of Customs and Excise (DJBC) and other related institutions and is known to have great potential to harm Indonesia both in terms of state revenue and public security. Some examples of threats from smuggling through HSC are money laundering crimes (TPPU) related to the smuggling of goods in the form of illegally imported cigarettes by utilizing the HSC fleet in the Batam Waters area. (MediaIndonesia, 2022)

The disclosure in October 2020 has taken strict action against a motor yacht or KLM which carries approximately 51,400,000 cigarettes illegally imported from Vietnam to the Raft Waters, Riau Islands. KLM, which is named Pratama, unloaded this illegal cigarette cargo in the middle of the sea with the ship to ship method, the ship distributed its illegal cargo to a number of HSCs aimed at several places around the East Coast of Sumatra. Furthermore, it was stated that the smuggling mode using HSC has become a big threat because it has expanded to other regional waters.

DJBC said that smuggling through HSC with the ship-to-ship method was initially limited to the Batam and Riau areas, but now it is starting to develop and be detected in other regions such as Aceh, West Kalimantan and Kalut. Even in the area around the waters of the Singapore Strait, the HSC smuggling mode has been recorded to have increased in frequency, from previously 3-6 times detected, to 10-14 times of crossing detection every week. In smuggling their luggage, the HSC used is a ship constructed of fiber with 4-8 units of high-speed engines that are open at the top of the ship (open-top) which is dedicated to smuggling activities.

Interestingly, the supervision and prevention of smuggling modes using HSC are still faced with various obstacles so that the threat from smugglers today can still be said to be very large. Some of the obstacles are related to two main things, namely the problem of the availability of comprehensive data and intelligence information from all parties involved, to the lack of surveillance support infrastructure, especially the patrol fleet where the ships used have quality and technology below the capabilities possessed in the HSC of the smugglers. Therefore, this paper attempts to discuss the following focuses:

1. What are the data and facts of the threat of smuggling using High Speed Crafts (HSC) in Indonesian waters?
2. How is the evaluation of strategic intelligence related to the security system from the aspects of human resources, facilities and infrastructure, and the processes that are carried out?

**Theoretical Overview**

**Strategic Intelligence**

The concept of strategic intelligence analysis is a form of special research that discusses various problems in detail so that it makes it easier to describe threats and risks, and existing opportunities to provide support in creating a program or policy (McDowell, 2009). Meanwhile, Prunckun (2010) who interprets the concept of intelligence into four meanings that can explain the intelligence approach, namely as an action or process used to produce knowledge; the part of the body of knowledge generated by each data collection action; in the form of organizations that deal with the way of knowledge
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extraction; and as reports and briefings produced in the process or by the organization (Andrew, Aldrich, & Wark, 2009).

Furthermore, Prunckun (2010) classifies Intelligence into three forms/categories of analysis, namely tactical intelligence, strategic intelligence and operational intelligence. Where strategic intelligence is defined as an intelligence action related to a long-term forecast or an effort to find a broad conclusion to set a much larger and more complex goal.

**National Resilience**

National resilience is the concept of how a country or nation has the ability to survive, adapt, rise and be resilient or strong through shocks and disturbances in economic, social and political aspects, ideologies and global challenges, as well as the threat of military attacks of other countries, acts of terrorism and radicalism, as well as other forms of attacks such as viruses or various diseases (Hanita, 2020). Or national resilience can also be interpreted as a dynamic aspect that a nation has or has related to all aspects of life in order to remain successful in the midst of environmental dynamics and changes in global conditions (Usman, 2003).

Usman (2003) also explained that in defining national resilience, it must involve three main definitions, namely, tanas as a dynamic condition of a nation that has the resilience to face threats and challenges, obstacles and disturbances. Second, tanas as a concept of IPOLEKSOBUDHANKAM which concerns geographical conditions, natural resources, population, ideology, political and economic dynamics, socio-cultural and security. Third, tanas as two sides of the currency, namely security and prosperity. In the context of this smuggling, this third aspect is closely related to the impact caused by smuggling.

**Customs**

The work system in customs is closely related to how customs institutions enforce regulations on international trade objects. Therefore, in the midst of trade dynamics, the customs system in world countries must be able to adapt to the many triggers of environmental turmoil such as technology, increasing the frequency of commercial trade, and the social and political environment. Therefore, the old or traditional regulatory approach of the current customs system can be said to be irrelevant (Widdowson, 2020). So that with the increasing speed of technology and the intensity of trade activities between countries, the need for a customs system that can make enforcement interventions based on identified risks is very high.

Based on Bajrami & Sharku (2010) Customs and Excise is an institution that plays an important role in political activities in a government in order to realize the national goals of a country. Customs and Excise in each country must be able to increase the country's revenue budget, provide facilitation for the country's trade and provide assistance in maintaining security at the same time. One of the services of the Customs and Excise agency that is important in the country's revenue is the collection of taxes that are vital to the economies of various countries (Morini, Porto, & Jr, 2016).

**Smuggling**

Smuggling or known as *Smuggling or Smokkle* is one of the acts or activities that are included in the form of criminal law which means the act of importing/exporting, moving goods between islands that are not in accordance with or complying with the applicable laws and regulations in a country, or in other words the activity is not accompanied by the fulfillment of customs formalities according to the law (Chibro, 1992). Meanwhile, Marpaung (1991) defines smuggling as an act of illegally importing...
goods to avoid the collection of import duties or entering goods that are prohibited by law.

Illegal activities in this case are the practice of smuggling such as prohibited goods, narcotics are included in the most well-known or prevalent criminal acts in the field of Customs in the form of violations of Customs law rules. The legal source of Customs crimes is Law Number 17 of 2006 concerning Customs. Indonesia, through Article 102, Article 102 A and Article 102 B of the Customs Law, has specifically regulated the crime of smuggling in the field of imports with a minimum prison sentence of 1 (one) year and a maximum prison sentence of 10 (ten) years and a fine of at least Rp.50,000,000.00 (fifty million rupiah) and a maximum of Rp.5,000,000,000.00 (five billion rupiah).

Research Methods

This paper uses a qualitative research approach with a descriptive analysis method. The descriptive analysis of this study was carried out with a specific review of the phenomenon and facts of the threat of smuggling with the HSC mode, as well as a descriptive description of how the surveillance efforts carried out by DJBC and other related officials in Indonesian waters. This paper uses data sourced from documents related to smuggling in water areas and scientific literature such as journals or thesis/dissertation research reports. The analysis carried out is a descriptive analysis by explaining/describing a series of facts and events related to the observed problems about smuggling from the perspective of strategic intelligence.

Results and Discussions

Data and Facts on the Threat of Smuggling Using High Speed Crafts (HSC) in Indonesian Waters

The smuggling mode uses High Speed Crafts (HSC) in Indonesian waters has often occurred in the past few years. In 2019, DJBC and the Ministry of Finance succeeded in uncovering the practice of smuggling thousands of electronic goods in the form of 27,732 mobile phones, 135 tablets, 1,342 laptops and 90 other electronic devices produced from China and India. The smuggled goods were electronic goods that were previously transited in Singapore and brought into Indonesian territory using HSC which made the pursuit and enforcement a little difficult. (Ananta, 2019)

From the action carried out, it is known that the HSC used by the smugglers directly entered Merak Port at high speed. The obstacles faced related to the speed of the ships used are the biggest obstacle in the disclosure of this smuggling practice. According to DJBC, the smuggler's HSC has a speed of 60 knots while the officer ship has a speed of 50 knots. In addition to the speed of this action in April 2019, it also revealed the fact that the same group of smugglers used a different landing point than before in the Malacca Strait to Java Island, namely Salira Beach, Banten where previously their destination was the East Coast of Sumatra. In this action, approximately DJBC and the Ministry of Finance together with Ministries/Institutions succeeded in thwarting the smuggling of electronic goods worth Rp 61.86 billion in the form of laptops, mobile phones, tablets, and iPads. (Ananta, 2019)

In addition to illegally imported electronic goods smuggled using HSC, other goods that use the same mode that DJBC and related parties have successfully acted on is the smuggling of illegal cigarettes in 2020. The chronology of the action carried out in this case can be said to be quite complex with a fairly long process. Based on the 2023 DJBC report, the enforcement of the practice of smuggling illegal imported cigarettes (plain /
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without excise tape) originating from Vietnam and Singapore for the period of August 2019 to October 22, 2020 in the mode of mother vessels carrying illegal cigarette cargo from abroad which after arriving around the waters of Berakit, Riau Islands unloaded the cargo (ship to ship) into the HSC to be subsequently taken to the east coast of the island of Sumatra such as the Tembilahan area, Guntung Island, Jambi etc.

Furthermore, according to the DJBC report (2023), the chronology of the disclosure of the case began with the action carried out as a result of the DJBC Wallacea Net integrated sea patrol activity on Thursday, October 22, 2020, which found KLM. Pratama carried out ship to ship activities with a small speedboat that carried unloading workers. After the unloading workers went up to KLM. Pratama, which was then replaced by HSC who will ship to ship the transfer of goods from KLM Pratama. When it was known that there was illegal activity on KLM Pratama, the BC 20007 Customs patrol boat approached KLM Pratama, but KLM. Pratama made an attempt to escape. The HSC who was quarantined managed to untie and escape. After giving chase, the patrol boat BC 20007 succeeded in stopping KLM. Pratama at the coordinate point 01°-25'-51" U / 104°-36'-37" T waters of Berakit, Bintan.

After an inspection of the cargo, then KLM Pratama along with the cargo of cigarettes and crew of the ship were taken action, and taken to the Riau Islands Special Type DJBC Regional Office, in Karimun for further handling. In the action of KLM. Pratama found a number of illegal goods in the form of: 3,390 cartons or 33,900,000 Cigarette Cartons (SPM) without Excise Tape of the "Luffman Full Flavor" brand, and 17,500,000 Cigarettes Without Excise Tape of the "Luffman Lights" brand.

From the prosecution of this case, the investigation process was continued which resulted in a decision that DS (skipper); KAS (ABK); MFE (ABK); RAH (ABK) has been legally and convincingly proven guilty of committing a criminal act jointly committing the crime of dismantling imported goods outside the Customs Area or other places without the permission of the head of the customs office. Then the subsequent investigation of suspect J (field coordinator), has legally and convincingly proven to commit the crime of smuggling imported goods in the form of cigarettes. In addition, from the disclosure and follow-up of the case at KLM. This primary found the following facts:

1. Cigarette transportation activities have been going on for a long time, and in the period from August 2019 to June 2020 there were at least 58 trips to transport cigarettes from Singapore, and 3 trips from Vietnam with the same modus operandi, namely by ship to ship cargo from the aircraft carrier into the HSC.
2. Cigarette transportation activities by this group, in addition to using KLM. Pratama, also uses many other wooden boats, KM. Tongkol 1, KM. Todak, KM. Elma Jaya, KM. Audi Jaya, KM. Paus, KM Shaki Pratama, Bima Nuantara, Mega Abadi, etc.
3. The ship-to-ship dismantling activity uses several HSC (high speed craft) speedboats to pick up cigarette cargo consisting of HSC with 7 engines, 6 engines and 5 engines with Yamaha, Mercury and Evinrude engines.
4. Investigator Dit. P2, the Banten DJBC Regional Office, and the Riau Islands Special DJBC Regional Office which are members of the DJBC TPPU Task Force together with officers from the TNI BAIS conducted a search of a place and building on Bontong Island, Batam City, then confiscated 13 Speedboat Units suspected of being related to illegal cigarette smuggling.

Then in May 2024, the practice of smuggling with a similar mode occurred again based on a report that BC Batam had secured and cracked down on one unit of fast boat.
(HSC) loaded with 184 thousand illegal cigarettes with the destination of Tembilahan, Riau. The enforcement was carried out in the waters of Crocodile Island, Batam, Riau Islands. The results of this action are a follow-up to reports and information about the transportation of goods in the form of cigarettes that are suspected to be illegal with HSC from Bridge 6 Barelang to Tembilahan, Riau. Based on the information, further coordination with the HSC BC11001 Ship which was suspected of carrying illegal goods was successfully secured by BC Batam. At the time of the action, BC managed to secure 184,000 illegal cigarettes and 7 crew members. (Hamapu, 2024)

With the existence of several case studies of smuggling through HSC, it can be concluded that the smuggling mode using HSC is one of the threats faced by related institutions, especially DJBC. According to the DJBC report (2018), the Strait of Malacca, which is the border between Indonesia and Malaysia, is the location with the number of findings of cracking down on various crimes through the mode of ship transportation. The following is a map of the distribution of actions carried out by DJBC during 2018.

![Figure 1. Distribution of DJBC Enforcement in the Indonesian Sea (DJBC, 2018)](image)

Furthermore, according to the DJBC report (2018), from the actions taken, four violations were obtained by the perpetrators, namely related to SPB LN Without Customs Notification, SPB DN did not go to the destination port (inter-island mode), SPB / Fake Documents / Forged and carrying goods or cargo without documents. From these violations, the smuggling mode using HSC is one of the threats and vulnerabilities faced by officers in conducting surveillance in Indonesian waters. According to DJBC (2018), the method they do is to unload in the middle of the sea (ship to ship) to then be taken to a number of areas in the Sumatra region, some even go directly to the island of Java.
Based on the image above, the smuggling mode using HSC generally begins with a trip to Jurong Port Singapore which begins with floating first at Pulau Dua, then loading the cargo at Jurong Port, and returning to Pulau Dua to do a clearance stamp. In the process of the clearance stamp, the position of the Automatic Identification System or AIS is still activated, after the clearance stamp is passed, the AIS is deactivated by the perpetrator ship to subsequently enter Indonesian waters and move to various destinations in Sumatra and Java.

Evaluation of Strategic Intelligence Related to the HSC Surveillance Security System from the Aspects of Human Resources, Facilities and Infrastructure and Processes Implemented

Conducting effective supervision certainly requires various considerations, ranging from the completeness of good resources both in the context of humans and facilities/infrastructure as well as the supervision process that is carried out. The completeness of this aspect of the security system is the basic thing that supports the implementation of intelligence functions in predicting threats and vulnerabilities. However, in the case of monitoring the threat of smuggling using HSC, there are still several important evaluations that can be a challenge for related institutions, especially DJBC in carrying out maximum supervision. Based on DJBC (2018), the supervision of aquatic areas is carried out comprehensively, but there are still limitations in terms of human resources, facilities and infrastructure, and the monitoring process carried out.

First, related to human resources, the main obstacle faced is the weak comparison of the availability of human resources with a very wide range of supervision objects and a very high frequency of ship traffic. The Singapore Strait is a strait located east of the Malacca Strait and west of the South China Sea flanked by Singapore to the North and the Riau Islands to the South. The Singapore Strait is a very crowded body of water crossed by international ships with a high risk of smuggling through HSC in this region. With these conditions, there are several offices of the Directorate General of Customs and Excise that carry out supervision in this area, namely: 1) Batam Type B Main Service Office, 2) Batam Type B Customs and Excise Operation Facilities Base, 3) Riau Islands Special DJBC Regional Office, 4) KPPBC TMP B Tanjung Balai Karimun, 5) KPPBC TMP B Tanjung Pinang, and 6) BC Type A Operation Base Tanjung Balai Karimun.
Of the entire supervisory office, there are at least 1,324 DJBC members or officers on duty (KWBCKepri, 2024). However, not all, or only a small number of members are assigned to the ship traffic supervision function, especially related to the threat of smuggling in the HSC mode. So from the low percentage of members who are in charge of supervising compared to the high frequency of goods traffic through ships in the Singapore Strait. So that in terms of the aging resources that carry out supervision, it can be said that the surveillance of HSC threats in the Singapore Strait is still in the category of having vulnerabilities.

Second, related to the aspect of facilities and infrastructure, limitations or vulnerabilities due to the lack of quantity of supervisory members make this aspect one thing that must be further improved. For this reason, in maximum supervision, DJBC needs to maximize the use of technology and facilities based on cutting-edge technology that allows officers to narrow the vulnerability space that Indonesia has. One of the weak points that DJBC realizes is that the capacity for supervision by officers is still lacking in terms of HSC equality owned by the perpetrators. Based on DJBC (2019), the perpetrator used a modified HSC and added an engine behind it so that it had 6 speeds with a maximum speed above 60 knots, while the ship owned by DJBC to monitor had a speed of around 50 knots.

Based on KWBCKepri, (2024) currently, regarding the supervision infrastructure, DJBC has been equipped with a fleet of patoroli ships which are divided into three types. The first type is the fast patrol boat (FPB) which is a boat that is specially designed to produce rafting ability and wide cruising power at high speed. The capacity of this FPB can accommodate 20-35 crew members or patrol members with a maximum speed of 25-30 knots. The second type is the very slender vessel FPB which is specially designed as a patrol boat to carry out pursuit tasks with a maximum speed of 50 knots. And the third type is a speedboat to reach coastal and river areas with a maximum speed of 50 knots.

Based on this data, it can be seen that there is still a gap between the capabilities of infrastructure facilities owned by smugglers (HSC) and ships owned by DJBC in terms of the maximum speed of the ship. So that a special evaluation that may be able to reduce
the effectiveness of monitoring smuggling threats using the HSC mode in the Singapore Strait. This can be seen from the action report carried out by the DJBC, which generally involves the use of modified HSC to have 5 units of Yamaha-branded drive motors with a capacity of 100 PK as seen in the following figure:

1. Crackdown on smuggling of 1000 fully loaded mobile phone cases by HSC Pro Eskpress with an HSC length of 12 meters.

2. Cracking down on the smuggling of 250 fully loaded cartons containing cellphones by HSC Sakti Gemilang with an HSC length of 12 meters.

3. Crackdown on smuggling of a full load containing Alcoholic Beverages (MMEA)/Liquor by Anonymous HSC with a length of 12 meters HSC.
Third, regarding aspects of the process carried out in supervision, HSC is also increasingly threatening because several factors such as HSC are difficult to detect because the supervision process carried out has implementation constraints. The obstacle is that often ships entering Indonesian territory do not activate the Automatic Identification System or AIS when entering Indonesian waters. In fact, the existence of AIS is very vital in surveillance because Indonesia has implemented the CSS radar or Coastal Surveillance System. The radar, which has been running since 2016, is a sophisticated radar owned by the Batam Customs Type B Main Service Office (KPU) which can detect a ship in great detail from a distance of 15 kilometers (Batamnews, 2016).

Because the vessels are not orderly in using AIS which is often turned off or not activated when entering Indonesian waters, the surveillance process using CSS is certainly not mekasimal so that it allows certain ships to escape supervision. Based on the Ministry of Transportation (2019), the cause of the number of individuals who do not comply with the AIS activation rules is related to several factors, namely the problem of different rules among related institutions/parties, and weak rule enforcement. So that the factor of the supervision process through CSS and AIS requires stronger efforts from all parties so that it can be implemented properly according to applicable rules.

The implementation of the regulation regarding the obligation to activate AIS on each ship can be seen from the data submitted by DJBC (2024), the obligation to activate AIS is reaffirmed through Permenhub 18/2022 concerning AIS Obligations is one of the supporting factors for supervision of ships entering Indonesian waters. Data shows an increase in the frequency of ships that activate AIS after this Ministerial Regulation is implemented. Before Permenhub 18/2022 came into effect, the average number of AIS lit in Indonesian waters was only around ± 47%. Meanwhile, after Permenhub 18/2022 was enacted, the average number of AIS lit in Indonesian waters increased to ± 86% and in 2024 the average number owned by AIS will also ± 86% (DJBC, 2024). However, the threat of smuggling vessels that do not activate AIS is still large until 2023, as can be seen from the following enforcement data carried out by DJBC:
In the future, the evaluation of the supervision process regarding the implementation of AIS required on every ship is one of the main things that must be done. The obligation to implement AIS has also been carried out by many other countries such as Singapore and Malaysia, both countries stipulate and require every ship to have this for their territorial surveillance. Due to the limitations of human resources and supporting facilities for supervisory officers, the main evaluation that must be carried out is to maximize the use of digital-based information system technology and carry out supervisory synergy and maximize data integration together with other related institutions. Maximizing the use of digital-based information system technology is carried out by DJBC by maximizing surveillance monitoring through the Automatic Identification System or AIS. With maximum AIS monitoring, movement and early detection of suspicions of vessels that have the potential to commit violations can be carried out before a direct inspection. The position, movement and potential destination of the ship can be used as a detection of these threats.

**Figure 4. Non-AIS Ship Enforcement Cases (DJBC, 2024)**
Then or additional aspects in addition to human resources, facilities/infrastructure and processes, aspects of supervision synergy and data integration together with other related institutions are also important aspects of the strategic intelligence principle by maximizing the wealth of data from various supervisory perspectives. Regarding supervisory synergy, the weakness realized by DJBC in supervising the movement flow of HSCs suspected of committing violations is the speed of the surveillance vessels owned. For this reason, before this challenge is solved by providing newer facilities, cooperation with other supervisory agencies is one solution that must be done at this time. As is known, in 2023 the Maritime Security Agency of the Republic of Indonesia (Bakamla RI) officially owns an HSC ship made by the nation's son with hull number HSC 32-02. The secured HSC 32-02 has a length of 14.30 m, a width of 3.3 m, with aluminum ship material, has a 3 x 425 HP engine that can spur at any time to a speed of 65 knots and is able to accommodate 6 officers. With this specification, it means equal to or even surpass the HSC ships that have been modified by the smugglers who have been acted upon so far.(Meilina, 2023)

Then related to data integration which is also part of the synergy between DJBC and other related institutions has also been well realized by DJBC. According to the DJBC, the vast area of Indonesia's oceans or waters results in the vulnerability of this sea area to be exploited to be used as a smuggling route for various kinds of illegal goods and even dangerous goods. So, in supporting marine patrol activities, DJBC established the Customs Marine Patrol Command and Control (Puskodal). The duties and work functions of Puskodal BC in general are to collect, analyze, provide or present data and information (datin), as well as to support marine patrol activities carried out by DJBC. Datin from Puskodal relates to data related to customs and excise sea surveillance, various systems needed in operations such as data support, information management and operational communication, operational support, as well as technical instructions for the implementation of activities, documentation and various DJBC datin security protocols (DJBC, 2024).

According to Puskodal BC, synergy is the key thing that must be done, therefore the initial steps taken are to synergize with seven ministries/institutions in Indonesia,
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namely the National Security Maintenance Agency (Baharkam) of the National Police, the Directorate General of Sea Transportation (Ministry of Transportation), the National Border Management Agency of the Republic of Indonesia, the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (KKP), the Maritime Security Agency of the Republic of Indonesia, the Coordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs and Investment, and the National Institute of Aeronautics and Space. In addition to domestic synergy, Puskodal BC also considers synergy with foreign institutions to be a strategic thing in mitigating the threat of crime in the sea area. For this reason, Puskodal synergizes with the Singapore Police Coast Guard as outlined in the cooperation agreement (MoU) in 2020.

Maximizing supervisory capacity is also carried out by continuing to add cooperation with as many related institutions as possible. Since its formation, Puskodal BC has also increased synergy and commitment through the signing of a cooperation agreement with the National Police Baharkam and the Directorate General of Sea Transportation on November 11, 2020. Then Puskodal has also entered into a cooperation agreement with the Water Police, KKP, the National Narcotics Agency (BNN), and the Marine and Coast Guard Unit (KPLP), in September 2021, in the context of implementing effective, effective and efficient operations in the context of preventing and eradicating the abuse of narcotics, psychotropics, and precursors (DJBC, 2024).

Conclusion

Based on the results of the previous discussion, it can be concluded that smuggling using High Speed Crafts (HSC) in Indonesian waters has often occurred in the past few years. In 2019 and 2020, the DJBC and the Ministry of Finance succeeded in uncovering the practice of smuggling using HSC which has the potential to cause considerable state losses in the smuggling of thousands of electronic goods in the form of 27,732 mobile phones, 135 tablets, 1,342 laptops and 90 electronic devices and the smuggling of illegal cigarettes. In the smuggling of electronic goods, the potential loss is worth up to Rp 61.86 billion. Meanwhile, in the smuggling of illegal cigarettes, investigators from DJBC found an alleged crime of money laundering by the smugglers.

This mode of smuggling using HSC is carried out by loading and unloading in the middle of the sea through the ship to ship method from large ships to HSC. Enforcement is challenged because the surveillance vessel facilities have a capacity that is not faster than the ships owned by the perpetrators, plus the changing point of the HSC of the smugglers spread across Sumatra and Java.

Then related to the evaluation of strategic intelligence related to the need for intelligence resources in the supervision of smuggling in the High Speed Crafts (HSC) mode, at least the DJBC must increase the surveillance capacity through the capacity and quantity of human resources and surveillance ship facilities that have capabilities above the facilities owned by smugglers. In addition, supervisory synergy with other institutions in terms of operational cooperation, the use of data integration is a must in maximizing supervision in a very wide Indonesian territorial waters.
References
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